

How to Be a Coherent Pragmatic Realist

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The aim of the paper is to sketch a conception of truth that combines seemingly incompatible ideas of realism, coherentism, and pragmatism. First, I argue that while pragmatic antirealism is incoherent, realism is pragmatically justified even if it is not true in the realist sense of the word. Next, I discuss Putnam's internal realism and show how it avoids both relativism and absolutism, being the former incompatible with realism while the latter incompatible with pragmatism. In conclusion I claim that, first, although pragmatism forces us to reject the realist idea of strict correspondence, it still leaves room for its idealized counterpart, and the question of the validity of idealization is to be solved in the context taking into account both pragmatic and realist considerations. Second, I claim that the strive for coherence is justified both realistically and pragmatically.