

## Philosophical background of syntax

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The aim of this talk is to present a new criterion for the subject-predicate distinction, which is crucial for constructing a credible logic of natural language and elucidating many key issues in the philosophy of language. First, I shall outline the problem which was brought to our attention in Peter F. Strawson's publications from *On Referring* up to *Subject and Predicate in Logic and Grammar*. Next I will seek to explain the challenges faced by Strawson and why, in the final account, his conception is not satisfactory. Then, against this background I shall present another criterion and argue that it overcomes the difficulties encountered by Strawson and helps to account for a wide range of linguistic phenomena in a unified, principled way. The core idea behind proposed criterion is a combination of Fregean idea of functoriality and the idea of two-fold intentionality (taking some hints and observations from early Husserl, but not restricted to his views). The criterion reveals philosophical foundations of Categorical Grammar and shows, among other things, that 'singular term' does not stand for a unified comprehensible notion.

### **Key Words**

Subject, predicate, singular term, Strawson, Frege, Husserl, Categorical Grammar